May 222018
 

In less than one month, the world’s largest sporting event, The World Cup, will begin.  The World Cup, which takes place every four years, perhaps is only rivaled by the Olympic games.  The teams, represented by 32 countries, play their way into the event with the host country’s team getting a bye into the event.  It is the most watched and anticipated sporting event in the world estimated audience is 3.5B.

There is a hand full of sponsors and partners for the World Cup, one of which is ABI and Budweiser.  While ABI is much maligned where its marketing is concerned, the World Cup sponsorship has to be a real win for ABI.  There may not be any better format than the World Cup to fit ABI’s global strategy.

A number of years ago, on a trip to Peru with Crystal beer, I visited a bar in Lima when a televised soccer game Peru was playing in America’s cup was on.  With one minute to play, Peru scored, tying the game.  The bar exploded with excitement and every piece of furniture not nailed to the ground was flying around the bar!  The place was crazy with excitement.

During the 2010 playing of the World Cup, while in Germany for Warsteiner we watched the game between Germany and Britain.  We were watching in a hotel bar in a small northern town with a large screen projected TV and all the customers were painted from head to toe, Germany colors with Germany hats and flags.  The party really did not start until the end of the game when Germany defeated Britain, 1-0.  The partying ended around 4 AM when the sun began to come up!

These two examples of just how much passion these countries have for their teams will play into ABI’s strategy.  One can just see ABI’s country-specific marketing plans around the World Cup focusing on Budweiser and supported by all the TV and social media support.

Unfortunately for ABI, the United States did not qualify a team for this year’s World Cup.  How this will play out in the TV and overall media ratings will be interesting giving the declining ratings of most major sports.  This includes professional football and now, even the recent Olympic games ratings were way down.  The question is, will the American fans watch the other countries games in the upcoming event?  No doubt the die-hard World Cup fans will, and many sports bars will be featuring the games and you can bet they will do well, but not well if it was a US team playing.

At Warsteiner our sales flew during Germany’s games no matter the time of the day when the game was on TV.  Will Budweiser sales do the same this year?  ABI has a global strategy for their three key brands and the World Cup is the best platform for ABI to develop these brands without a doubt.

It will be interesting to see how the ratings come in after the event is over but more so, just what Budweiser looks like in four years globally from today.

Brands must become architects of community..

 

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
May 152018
 

If one were to earmark the date of Warsteiner’s slow decline it would be August 2008.  In the third quarter of 2008, Warsteiner Importers Agency of the U.S. set a record in STWs, STRs, and profit.  At the same time, in Germany, Albert Cramer, the eighth generation Cramer family member to lead the brewery, fired his longtime CEO.   Albert had learned of multiple questionable and illegal transactions that were taking place in South America and Africa.

At the same time, Albert faced several personal tragedies, including the loss of his longtime spouse who had been thrown by a horse spooked during a summer storm, followed shortly thereafter by the announcement of his incurable cancer.  These tragedies resulted in Albert’s decision to turn over the leadership of Warsteiner to his daughter, Catherine Cramer.  Catherina at this time was in her early 30s.

Catherina, with the support of the lead accounting staff, instituted what is referred to as the four-eyes business model. Warsteiner company-owned importers implemented a policy requiring each department head to report directly to the corresponding department head in Germany.   Simply put, accounting in the various countries reported to accounting in Germany, and likewise with the sales and marketing departments.  This resulted in countries across the world having no direct leadership.

The consequences of Warsteiner’s actions are best illustrated by the downturn in the U.S. sales.  Within six months of implementation of the four-eyed leadership model, the U.S. operation lost almost 40% of its total volume with countries around the world experiencing similar results.

After 10 years, Warsteiner has not altered this model.  The volume loss continues today, however, the industry has recently learned of another unfortunate result of this model.  In the last several weeks, the TTB announced that it had fined Warsteiner Importers Agency $900,000 for violating FAA acts.  These violations include an exclusive outlet, tied house, commercial bribery, and consignment sales.  The violations occurred between January 2015 and continued into 2018.

Last fall, Warsteiner lost or replaced a number of U.S. employees whose positions have now been filled.  It appears that the managers in the U.S. retained their jobs, the brewery, however, the export director is no longer employed.  More than likely his leaving is a direct result of this fine.

There is little doubt that Warsteiner Importers cannot pay the required fine. The brewery will have to step in and pony up.  Rest assured once the fine is paid, there will be a new long-term liability on Warsteiner’s balance sheet in the amount of $900,000.  This will certainly handcuff the next individual who will lead the U.S. operation.

So the other question is: how do the U.S. Warsteiner distributors and retailers view this penalty and fine?  Is this the beginning of the end of what little is remaining of the Warsteiner U.S. business, and if so, could Warsteiner close down the agency and assign importing rights elsewhere?

It is quite clear that this four-eyed model does not work and needs to change immediately. Only Catherina can make that decision.  Her legacy is tied to the success of the brewery and there is still time for her to make the necessary changes.

Be prepared for more fines and penalties coming from the TTB.  Mistakes are always forgivable if one has the courage to admit them…

 

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
May 082018
 

Texas had the highest US volume sales for Schlitz when Stroh took over the brand, an action which created excitement among the wholesalers.  For the first time in a number of years, the wholesalers finally felt they had a chance to right the ship with the Schlitz brand, while at the same time obtaining a major brand in Stroh’s.

In a very short time, however, it became apparent that not only was there no improvement, business, in fact, was getting worst.  There were numerous statewide Schlitz/Stroh meetings that provided the wholesales ample opportunities to meet with Peter Stroh to discuss the issues.  The wholesalers, however, were never allowed to express their concerns as most of the Stroh management was composed of left-over Schlitz leaders who did not want Peter Stroh to be available to the wholesalers.

Not that it would have made any difference in the outcome, but after all these years, one wonders what the results might have been if the wholesalers could have made an impact with Peter Stroh.

This year’s Craft Brewers Conference in Nashville welcomed about 14,000 attendees.  It was once again, a tremendous turnout!

The CBC, and to a great degree, the NBWA, have consistently had the same program, the same speakers and the same schedule year after year with only industry statistics changing.  So, annually, attendees hear the same message with the only new input coming from the touting of changes in the industry trends.  While the craft segment is shifting, one would not be aware of such movement simply by listening to the speakers.

As with most companies, if one wanted to learn the real trends and happenings, one must listen to the employees, or in this case, to the craft vendors.  This year the vendors were very happy with the overall turnout and the number of leads they acquired, however, several trends were quite apparent.

With the overall slowing of the craft segment, one could not help but notice the absence of PE firms, banks, lawyers and accountants who in the past were there with the intent of securing a craft beer presence.  This is not to say that all from said group were absent, but their presence was noticeably less than in past years.

The one area that was almost totally absent this year, after a major presence in previous years, was the college-taught craft programs.  The usual brewing schools were present and focused on brewing skills, including Cal-Davis and Middle Tennessee State, however, no schools that focused on the business aspect of the craft industry were at the conference.

So the question is, does the absence of those institutes of high learning that focused on the business aspect of the industry indicate that either: one, the schools are so full they do not need to market such programs; or two, does it mean that with the slowing of the craft brewing segment there are fewer students enrolling?  Many of the schools at the conference had a representative present, but the effort was greatly reduced from that at past conferences.

If as recently reported, the real growth in crafts is with those brewers who started after 2014, it would then seem that the schools should be more into marketing than before.  Without the skill-set needed, those new brewers will not be around for long.

If one wants to know what is really happening in crafts, just go to the exhibition floor, the vendors will tell you.

Don’t find fault, find a remedy.

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Apr 302018
 

Last week, while visiting an account in the Texas Hill Country, I along with the other customers in a local restaurant noticed that our phone emails had crashed.  In addition, we were unable to use our credit cards to pay for our purchases because all the terminals in the restaurant also were also down.  This was somewhat odd because the TVs and the electricity were working in this particular restaurant and throughout the town.

When I returned to my hotel, however, I discovered that this particular hotel’s TVs were down and there was no internet.  Throughout the Hill Country, AT&T phones were out, including my hotel’s landlines!  I borrowed a phone connected to Verizon and called home to inform my family of my situation.  Even the local Walmart had lines of customers extending out into their parking lot as the retailer could only accept cash given that their credit card terminals were also down.

At 3 AM, my phone started going off.  After eight hours, AT&T had gotten their system up and running again. I later discovered that someone had plowed their vehicle into an AT&T tower some 25 miles away, resulting in a 70-mile outage.

That eight-hour interval with no internet service illustrated quite clearly how dependent we have become on the internet.  If you are under the age of forty, you have never lived without the internet.  Those over the age of fifty can remember when, as young beer salespeople, we had to find landlines to call our offices.  All our weekly reports were sent to the home office by snail mail typed out on a typewriter.

It was not until the 1990s that all of this changed. Gambrinus provided their field staff with laptops and a VMX system for calls.  This voice message system predominantly enabled directives to the field for projects.  In 1996, Gambrinus set up AOL account, their first email system.  Even with all of this, we still did not have cell phones and all correspondence to wholesalers had to be delivered by snail-mail.

Even before cell phones, which at first, were bolted into your car, we had pagers.  Of course, we all lived through the fax machine days using that old wax style paper that always seemed to curl and smell.

Today, cell phones are more advanced and powerful than computers of fifty years ago.  Probably more than any one thing, the internet had as much to do with the growth of the craft beer segment as anything.  Today social media is the marketing focus for the craft beers.

The recent internet outage was a reminder of just how the industry and the world have changed in the last twenty years. Most of us are lost without internet connectivity.  Industry pundits continue to refer to the Millennials as the change agent in the industry, when in reality, the change is due to the technology that has been embraced by a generation who knows no other form of communication.

The internet, man, is a beautiful thing.

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Apr 242018
 

Schlitz died when senior management decided to maximize profits by using chemical additives that changed the flavor and look of the beer.  Schlitz’s white knight was Stroh’s but the heavy debt, along with the lack of senior management leadership, led that venture to also close and sell out.

Heileman Brewing Co., under the leadership of Russell Cleary, grew to be the fourth largest brewery in the U.S. in the early 1980s.  Heileman went public on the New York stock exchange, a move which eventually ended in a hostile leveraged buyout by Alan Bond.  Bond-financed the buyout with junk bonds at the time.

Bond’s financial collapse led to G. Heileman filing bankruptcy in 1991.  Hicks and Muse bought the firm in 1994 and then sold it to Stroh two years later.  This story ends when Stroh sold part of the company to Pabst and the other part to Miller.  Once again, another story of how the lack of leadership combined with heavy debt undid several very successful breweries and basically killed some previously great beer brands.

One would think that given the history in this industry, others would be aware of and learn from these obvious pitfalls. Sadly, this has not been the case.  A number of small breweries have closed over the past 12 months.  This is not surprising as the pundits and others have predicted this fall out for some time as these closings are not focused on just one market or state, but in all 50 states.

The recent closing and foreclosure of Green Flash Brewing Co. is the first closing that has caught many by surprise.  GF was a brewery that was selling almost 100K bbls. per year.  They closed two breweries, laid off 75 people, pulled out of 42 states and are now being sold off!

Many industry pubs have written about what went wrong with GF through yearly timelines.  All indicate very poor senior management decisions from package sizes, flavors, and pricing.  Through rapid, and what appears to be the uncontrollable expansion eastward, the brewery imploded.  Management did not provide the products and packaging the consumer was looking for simply because they, management, did not listen to their people.  In other words, GF was telling the consumer what to drink, not listening to what the consumers were telling them.

Is it possible that GF had another agenda?   Was that other agenda to create a national growth trend and expansion to catch the eye of a potential buyer?  Grow the volume and pad the numbers so that a major brewer would take notice and make an attempt to acquire GF?  Why not?  It has happened before!

Perhaps GF’s timing was off by five years on either side.  In 2013, the craft segment was on fire, while major breweries and PE firms were kicking tires everywhere.  In 2023, by focusing on their own backyard and not aggressively expanding, GF, with five more years of solid financial and volume growth, might have been in a stronger position to sell out.

Whatever GF had designed it did not work which all comes back to leadership.  As they say, “you don’t lose with the same team twice.”

Most brands start with a strong base and kept a strong belief…

 

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Apr 172018
 

When Krombacher decided to export to the U.S., their target markets were New York, Chicago and LA.  After appointing a New York distributor in 2011, and working through the necessary details, the brand was launched with some small success.  As with many imports from other countries, the plan was to first acquire distribution in the low hanging fruit areas, (e.g. German accounts and the major liquor and chain stores).

During the rollout period, Krombacher was notified about the existence of a key retailer who owned four pub/sports bars, three of which were located on Long Island and one in Manhattan.  The account featured over 40 brands on draft, mostly imports and crafts, with a number of packages.  The account was one that any brewer would have loved to have had representation in.

The owner made it very clear that he was interested in putting Krombacher on tap in all four of his accounts.  Not because Krombacher was Germany’s top selling beer, but because the retailer wanted new outdoor patio furniture for all of this accounts. If Krombacher so agreed, payment for the furniture would have been made payable to the retailer’s marketing company. In return, the beer would stay on draft for one year in all four accounts.

This was an example of a classic retailer pay-to-play scenario.  One must wonder, with the number of other brands on tap, what this retailer charged other breweries for putting their beer in his accounts.  By leveraging such keg boxes, glassware, furniture, cash, etc. this retailer could have put himself in business by leveraging the breweries.

This is just one example of a retailer leveraging his bars against brewers who are willing to do whatever it takes to gain distribution and exposure.  As the industry knows, this type of deal-making is in all states, and given the number of crafts and imports, retailers are saying “why not take advantage of these opportunities?”

For several months the TTB, along with the state of Florida, has been investigating illegal activity by brewers and importers in that state.  While there has yet been no official announcement, one medium-size importer was fined by the TTB for buying-off retailers in that state.  The initial fine was in excess of seven figures.  Lawyers are working to negotiate the amount of the fine and the industry will soon know.

The TTB continues to expand their investigations into other states as well.  The agency is teaming up with state agencies in California, Colorado, Nevada and New York. In the coming months, the TTB plans to announce all fines and offending companies involved. It has been rumored; however, that prior to mitigation, the total amount of the fines could be more than $30 million.

It is a good bet that those companies who are fined range from small crafts to much larger breweries.  It is also a good bet that the fines leveraged will be sizably substantial to ensure violators are served up as examples of these unethical and illegal business actions.  Given the difficulty of obtaining distribution, crafts and importers will continue to work around the system using whatever means they can to gain distribution.  Retailers know this and will use that knowledge for their own interests.

Perhaps the TTB or the CBC leadership should speak to this issue at the upcoming convention. But will it make any difference if they do voice their concerns?

If you are not cheating, you are not trying…

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Apr 102018
 

Constellation Beers’ 2018 numbers are nothing short of remarkable, especially considering the state of the rest of the beer industry.  Constellation’s beer business grew depletions by 9.8% for the year; shipments were a step behind, up 8.8%.; and net sales grew by double digits, up 10.1%. Overall, Constellation’s operating income was up 19.8%.

Beer Business Daily reported the following statistics for Constellation Beers’ Q4, the three months ending February 28th:  depletions, shipments, net sales and operating income were all up double digits. Depletions were up 11%; shipments were up 10.2%, and net sales and operating income were both up 11.9%.

What is even more remarkable is the fact that Constellation announced a long-term goal of 600 million cases in total, or the in-house defined goal of 2-2-1-1.  This translates into 200 million cases of Corona and its line extensions, 200 million cases for Modelo, 100 million cases of Pacifico, and 100 million cases of their crafts and other beers.  This includes growing 94 million cases in the next three years.

Constellation was driven by traditional marketing as they increased their marketing spending, new product development, and expansion of their other breweries into Obregon, Sonora by $900 million dollars.

All this growth has created 70 distributors in the Constellation gold network that have sold over one million cases of their brands!  Constellation has eight distributors with over a 30% share.  What is more remarkable is that ALL of the Constellation distributors grew in 2017 and half of the distributors grew at double digits!

It is generally accepted that the industry has three distinct networks: the red, or the AB network; the blue, or the MC network; and now the gold, or the Constellation network.  The red and blue networks are struggling in comparison to the performance of the gold network.

More distributors in the blue network also sell the gold portfolio. This is due to the fact that a great majority of the red network opted not to acquire the gold portfolio during the years when AB distributors were exclusive to AB.  Hindsight is 20/20.

The question is: what will this gold network look like in the future?  Consider what will happen if the gold network achieves its growth targets. Will those distributors who have the gold portfolio be known only as a gold distributor?  Will their MC or AB portfolio be “just another vendor” if the gold brands represent 50%+ of the market or an even a higher percentage of the distributor’s overall volume?  How will a much smaller AB or MC view and handle such a situation?

What would occur in the MC and AB houses if Constellation’s sales stall or slow dramatically in the upcoming years?  Perhaps a more pressing question would be, if the above happens, how will Constellation handle the situation?  Will Constellation approach their distributors as Schlitz or AB did 50 years ago, ensuring the distributors make the decision to go exclusively with the gold network and sell the other brands? Or will they sell Constellation to an exclusive distributor?

Today the gold network and Constellation Brands will work toward these goals as their sales and profits continue to exceed expectations. As with all brands, however, there will come a time when the upward trend will come to an end.  Those gold distributors should consider the future as it is just around the corner. Let’s hope Constellation sees it, too.

I drank beer and I had a career year…

 

 

 

 

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Apr 032018
 

As discussed in past articles, when I took over the Schlitz operation in 1981, the territory included a number of counties in far south Texas. Three of these counties did 95% of the volume.  In those counties, I had nine wholesalers competing within the same area: one Budweiser, one Miller, two Coors, two Lone Star, one Pearl/Imports, one Hamm’s/imports, and Glazers, who only had Heineken.

In the early 1980s, Schlitz held a +40% share of the volume which created a great deal of competition for the remaining 60% of the business.  Economic setbacks which occurred during the period made for an even more challenging marketplace.  Mexico had a major peso devaluation, oil embargos devastated the area, a region-wide freeze literally killed the citrus industry, and finally, Stroh’s purchased Schlitz.  The entire South Texas market shrank as unemployment rocked to 50%, all of which combined to drive distributor consolidation at a much-accelerated rate as compared to other U.S. markets.

Fast forward to early 2000, and there were only two distributors left in the South Texas market: the AB house, which now has a number of other brands and the MC house, now owned by Glazer’s beer division.  There is also a small craft distributor operation owned by Ben E. Keith.

Those key brands distributed by nine different wholesalers in the 80s are now housed in only two distributors.  This scenario is similar to other areas of the U.S., as brewery consolidation, along with the need for wholesalers to eliminate costs, has driven the industry in this position of consolidation.

Craft breweries have, for years, been upset at their inability to get to market in addition to the lack of focus by the distributors on their products.  Yet every year the industry continues to lose volume. Pundits target ineffective marketing, changes in demographics and aggressive marketing by the wine and spirit industries as reasons for the decline in beer sales.  In last week’s post, we noted the industry’s use of dollar growth as a major performance measurement versus volume growth as a measurement, which has been the standard in the past.

Pundits purport that for a craft to grow and survive the craft has to remain local and concentrate their resources in their backyard, and not expand into other states. Such pundits site lack of resources by small breweries and their need to concentrate their business locally.  These decisions are controllable by the small breweries.

A case can be made, however, that all of the industry consolidations have created a lack of in- market competition.  Consolations, along with the elimination of a vendor assigning brands to several wholesalers (example: how G. Heileman operated in the 1980s) necessitates that in order for a brewery to grow, said brewery must create a model which forces it to fulfill the role of a wholesaler’s sales team. In reality, this drains resources that could be used for marketing and above-the-line media spending.

For a wine and spirit wholesaler to grow without franchise protection, those companies have to execute against specific goals.  For breweries to grow, the brand building falls on the breweries shoulders’ to survive, something that is easier with a brewery taproom as its anchor.

Consolidation to the point of monopoly has never served the consumer – ever.

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Mar 272018
 

The beer industry has transformed dramatically in the past 80 years, but one constant has remained, and that is the number one selling beers have evolved generationally every 15 to 20 years.  A more recent change is the method in which the industry now measures success in terms of the number one selling brands.  On might say, this measure of success is like putting lipstick on a pig?

For 16 years, Pearl was the number one selling beer in Texas.  Pearl’s run came to an end in 1969 when Schlitz becoming the top seller in the state.  Texas, like other states at that time, had a popular local brand which maintained its sales lead for years.  Beginning in 1966, Coors expanded into North Texas and became the leading brand in that region of the state, Schlitz, however, maintained the overall volume in Texas. Schlitz retained the lead until the early 1980s when Miller Lite became the front-runner.  A generation later, it was Bud Light, a brand which is currently losing its position after holding the lead for years.

IRI data for the 52 week period ending February 24th shows Bud Light down -8.8% while Miller Lite, the number two brand, is down -3.6% for the same period. These measurements are in dollars, NOT volume!  Total dollar sales in Texas are also down by -1.3%.  On the plus side, Ultra is now the number three best-selling by dollars at a +19.7%, surpassing Coors light.  If Ultra’s trends continue, it will be in the number two position by the end of the year.

Modelo is also flying high and will soon pass both Budweiser (down) and Corona (flat) by the end of the year.  Again, these statistics are all reflective of the dollar amount.  Such measurements hide the industry’s overall decline in volume, but also show how this generation of beer buyers is buying up.  In other words, the current age group of consumers is willing to spend more for their beer.

Similar to the other changes discussed, Pearl, a regionally priced beer, lost its ranking to Schlitz, a nationally priced beer, who lost it’s ranking to Miller Lite, a slightly more expensive beer.  It should be noted that when introduced, Lite was a slightly higher price for the retailer.  Now we are seeing the growth of Ultra, an even steeper priced beer.

This increase in dollar volume is great for the industry but the question arises:  Is the industry trading volume for dollars?  Each generation of beer drinkers has raised the price of the product, and for years the industry continued to successfully grow.  Recently, however, or since InBev bought AB, industry volume has decreased as prices have increase.  A case in point is MolsonCoors and other domestic brands.

Now market share is all about dollars, not volume. Does that really measure the brand or does it simply measure the consumer?  Globally, ABI is at 57% of dollar share, where their volume share is only 33%.  These numbers alone make it simple to understand why dollars are now used to explain share. Currently, dollars are over half the market whereas volume is only a third of the market.

Both measurement for ABI and MolsonCoors are down, yet the opposite is true for Constellation Brands.  In ten years or so another generation of buyers will be defining the direction of the beer industry. Based on the past history, the only thing we can be certain of is that the newest buyers’ choice of segment will be at a higher price point.  Who cares about volume!!

Brands are born, not created…

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Mar 202018
 

The history of Heineken’s expansion and growth after WWII has been previously documented in past blogs.  The importer, Van Munching, predominantly appointed liquor houses to distribute the beer. This was, at the time, a logical way to distribute beer, as the trade channels that sold the most volume were liquor stores, upscale bars and restaurants.

The rise of Corona, however, in the 1980s motivated Heineken to acquire the importing rights, which then began the movement from liquor houses to beer houses.  Heineken had no choice as the brand was falling behind Corona, especially in terms of distribution.

The early 90s saw multiple liquor companies interested in future growth; expand into the beer segment of the industry by creating beer departments.  Glazers took the lead in purchasing beer distributorships, a strategy which at the time proved to be successful.  Many of the liquor houses, however, Glazers included, have in recent years, sold off their beer portfolios to local MC or AB houses.  The reason for these reversals in the purchase of beer distributorships is delineated below.

Initially, many of the liquor companies believed that by expanding into beer sales they could be a one-stop vendor for the retail market.   There was also the belief that the liquor companies could leverage their combined portfolios and gain an advantage over their competitors and, to some extent, the retailers.

Beer vendors saw the above mentioned model as the first option in a market in which AB, at the time, exclusively held an almost three-fourths exclusivity of their wholesalers.  With the passage of time, however, many breweries came to the same conclusion as Heineken had years earlier:  that liquor houses are not going to service the retail industry as well as beer wholesalers.  Being in one of these liquor houses limited the growth of a brand.

Now, 25 years later, Constellation Brands, is hoping to capitalize on their liquor and wine portfolios with their powerhouse beer brands through the leverage of their chain teams and sharing data.  Needless to say, if Constellation Brands is able to create an effective model (Total Beverage Solutions) to take advantage of their portfolios in the chains, Constellation Brands would have a tremendous advantage over their competition.

History has shown that on paper, these models appear to provide an overall advantage; however, the actuality is that such a version has yet to be successful.  The culture of the three industries: spirits, wine, and beer, is totally different.  Selling beer differs from selling liquor, which differs from selling wine.  Of course, warehousing and delivery work, but that is on the wholesale side, not on the supplier side.

In the end, management in both the liquor and wine side has, and will continue to focus on their respective portfolios.  The liquor and wine industries have little interest in selling beer.  Constellation Brands, to be successful in the Total Beverage Solutions strategic plan, will need to understand these challenges.  If there is any company with the means to be able to take advantage of this model, however, it will be Constellation Brands.  Their portfolio gives them a great advantage going forward.

Collaborations have no meaning if one plus one does not equal much more than two…

 

 

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am