Geoff

Previous key positions: President/CEO Krombacher USA 2010-2012, President/CEO Warsteiner Importers Agency 2006-2010, Corporate Director of Malt Beverages Glazer's 1999-2006, Regional Sales Manager Gambrinus 1996-1998, VP Marketing and Distribution Texas Brewing Co. 1996, President Distributor Investment Group 1991-1995, General Manager Coast Distributors (Columbia) 1988-1990, Distributor Development Manager Coors Brewing Co. 1987, President Texas Beers Inc., 1981-1987, Executive VP and GM Coors of Kansas 1978-1981, VP Sales Coors NE 1976-1978, others were sales manager Mid-State Beers, District Mgr. Lone Star Brewing Co and route sales Willowbrook. Active member of many industry associations such as NBWA, WBDT, Oregon Beer, Washington Beer, Utah Beer, Kansas Beer and Louisana Beer assoc. Nominated or won: Inner Circle, Founders, Proud Lion and other awards. Named industry expert in US Bankrupcy, Federal and many state courts.

Apr 232019
 

Despite a Denver snow storm, another successful Craft Brewers Conference recently concluded. As is typical at these conferences, old friendships were renewed and new ones were formed. Brewers and distributors visited, learn about new industry topics, and viewed the exhibits. The CBC continues to dwarf all other beer industry conventions with more than double the attendance at the NBWA. Expect the CBC’s attendance growth to continue at next year’s event in San Antonio.

One of the more interesting speeches at this year’s CBC was made by Marc Sorini, in his annual appraisal of governmental and legislative affairs. After providing an update on the history of franchise laws, Marc noted that some states are finally loosening their franchise laws. As he noted, this move could signal the beginning of states’ siding with the craft industry. According to Marc, “Wholesalers have massively consolidated and now have more than enough clout to protect themselves both legislatively and legally.” Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Maine all are currently undergoing some form of franchise reform.

Each state has a different sales volume maximum which is required in order for the wholesaler’s supplier to have the right to terminate “at will” without the necessity of paying to terminate the contract. The status of each state’s bill varies.  Some bills will not make it out of committee and some bills will not get to a vote, while others will.

Certainly most in the industry will celebrate this news; but should they? On the surface it appears that these laws are advantageous for the small suppliers, enabling such suppliers the ability to terminate and move to a different supplier without financial compensation; and thereby providing improved ability to execute on the suppliers’ products.

Suppliers, however, need to first step back before concluding that these changes in franchise laws are advantageous. Consider that there are two, perhaps three wholesalers in any major market. A supplier’s choices are very limited. If any supplier believer that a wholesaler would take on a new vendor without franchise protection, they should reconsider.

The reality is that without protection, wholesalers will rewrite their distributor contracts. It is possible that many wholesalers could ask both parties to wave all provisions of their respective state beer franchise protection laws and only use the contract as the legal document. Rest assured these contracts will have provisions on terminations and multiples. The language will be very wholesaler specific, with little regard to the rights of the supplier. In fact, most of these contracts will become evergreen. Suppliers will not have any choice but to go along or simply pack up and leave. Since there are only two or three wholesalers, the supplier is right back to where they started. Wholesalers may lose their franchise protection but they will not compromise on contracts.

Divorce is probably as painful as death.

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Apr 162019
 

Last week Stone Brewing announced the sale of their Berlin facility to BrewDog of Scotland for an undisclosed amount.  Stone has owned the brewery since 2014, but has now decided to leave the Germany market.

In an August 2014 edition of this blog, (Sound strategy starts with having the right goal.), Greg Koch, Stone’s co-founder, blamed the closure of the brewery on multiple issues, one being building complications and the resulting delay in construction.  Koch claimed that when concerns arose, construction was halted and no solutions were presented.  He added that the delays cost Stone both time and money, stating that the project was “too big and bold” for Germany.  Koch lamented that the brewery should have started smaller, thus giving all involved the opportunity to gain insight into what was necessary for successful growth.

In the same post referenced above, the challenges that Stone Brewing faced in building a facility in Germany were outlined.   And as it turned out, those challenges were real and Stone is, in fact, closing.

Various posts have addressed the topic of foreign ownership and management faced by beer companies hoping to establish in the U.S. market. Such companies continue to fail or fall short of their goals by not adapting to the U.S. beer industry model.  Leaders, who have been successful in other countries, fail to understand the American systems or they try to incorporate their countries’ systems in our country. The result is frequently failure.

ABI, MC, Pabst, Heineken (to some degree) and others breweries are managed by non-American leaders.  But the ongoing theme seems to be: is this working for these companies?

Jeff Alworth, who writes a blog entitled Beervana, criticized Koch when he, Koch, announced the Berlin project by smashing a pile of German beers with a rock. Shortly thereafter, Koch exclaimed that “Berlin is not really a beer city yet.”  That is like saying Augusta, Georgia is not a golf town yet.  That statement surely endeared Koch with many of the Germans.

Simply because a brewery finds success in their home country does not mean that same success will be duplicate in another country.  It does not matter whether you are dealing with the U.S. or another country, the facts are the same.  As we discussed in the 2014 post, Germans have local breweries and support them, just like Americans support our local crafts.  The German’s might have tried one of Stone’s beers, but in the end, they will support their own countries’ beers.

Based on Stone’s approach to the Berlin brewery, the chances of success were slim at best.  The same can be said of other breweries that approach business in a similar fashion.   It is an historical fact.  Having spent many years with German breweries, Stone’s struggles come as no surprise.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

 

 

 

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Apr 092019
 

The term GOAT is an acronym for “Greatest of All Time.” And while GOAT discussions are held regarding a variety of topics, the area of sports is frequently one that is deliberated and these conversations about which sports are the greatest are frequently held in sports bars.  For example: the greatest football player of all time, the greatest basketball team, the best golfer, etc. Mathematicians or statisticians might create algorisms that, in their opinion, prove who is the greatest.  As you can guess, such analyses do little more than throw gas on the fire, but it is always fun to engage in the conversations.

Now that the first quarter of the year is in the books, pundits and others are debating the myriad of reasons why sales in the beer industry have declined.  Someone in the industry might tell you sales are down as a result of “Corn Gate,” the ingredient battle between AB and MC.  Honestly, if this is what we are now arguing about, the beer industry is in trouble!

Perhaps the term GOAT in the beer industry should not apply to a particular brand or brewery, but rather the term GOAT should be known as the Greatest of Any Time?  In other words, where are today’s industry leaders and who are they?

Many leaders of the past, including Pete Coors and Jim Koch are on the back side of their careers and Bill Hackett just retired.  The leadership void between the two industry giants, AB and MC is now quite evident.  It seems obvious that there are no new leaders stepping up to replace these storied industry giants.  But, perhaps, one could make the case that the industry no longer needs such leaders to develop and protect it because the industry is so diversified.

The usual adage purports that those currently exhibiting success are the next generation of leaders.  Perhaps the recent industry articles on Tito’s Vodka illustrate this truth. Tito’s continues on its sales rampage, taking no hostages nor deviating from their core marketing.

Perhaps it would be difficult to follow in the footsteps of a leader whose company has negative growth. Some will support this supposition and see no need for leaders like as Pete or even August III with the current industry diversification of creative products and segments.

One can argue that now, not in the past or the future, the beer industry really needs true and strong leadership.  The industry needs those who will look past “Corn Gate” and speak directly and forcefully to the real issues and problems.  GOAT = Greatest of Any Time but now would be as good a time as ANY for leadership.

GOAT.

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Apr 022019
 

In the early 1970s, Texas was by far the largest volume-producing state for the Jos. Schlitz Brewing Company.  Texas itself was a stand-alone division of Schlitz, and the largest division in the company. Many of the Schlitz wholesalers were ranked in the top ten in volume:  Houston, San Antonio, and Dallas were all in the top five, with Austin and the Valley rounding out the top 10.  These large distributors did not need multiple markets to obtain their high rankings, in other words, their footprints were exclusive to their respective cities.

Even the expansion of Coors into South Texas in the mid-1970s did little to dent Schlitz’s market share.  The Coors expansion, coupled with the rapid growth of Miller Lite, however, had raised eyebrows among some of the Schlitz wholesalers who began to look at their own futures.  Coors had gone with exclusive wholesalers and their initial market share was as low as two to three percent, up to 13%. It would, however, be several years before the Coors houses started selling out to other distributors.

By the early 1980s, with their volume in decline and a loss of confidence in Schlitz’s senior management, Schlitz wholesalers began to sell their companies in an effort to maximize their own investments.  The Valley was one of the first to sell, followed by San Antonio. The Alamo City still had Schlitz roots in their GLI make-up and, interestingly, the Schlitz warehouse sign still sits on top of their warehouse.  The sale of Austin, Dallas, and others key markets quickened the death of Schlitz.

So the question is, did these buyers get any return on their investment in Schlitz?  It is probably safe to say that those who sold never regretted their decision to sell. Honestly, some may have wished they had sold years earlier.  It is all about timing when selling.

Recently it was announced that Silver Eagle, the largest AB house in the U.S., had sold its Houston operation.  The selling price was rumored to be close to one billion dollars.  It is no secret that the volume losses of Bud and Bud Light have been dramatic with no turnaround in sight.  John Nau, the owner of Silver Eagle will maintain ownership over the San Antonio branch. Many of the small to medium size AB houses will most certainly be contemplating selling to large AB operations where certain synergies can be realized.  It makes sense given current trends for the AB operations.

The Schlitz operations of 30 years ago were not as diversified as today’s businesses.  Combined with the rapid decline of Schlitz, these wholesalers had no choice but to sell.  I have never had a former Schlitz wholesaler state regret at their decision to sell, while on the contrary, I have had both former Coors and AB wholesalers state their regret in selling.

The next five years will shed some light on the future of many of the AB houses.

Success is a matter of luck and timing.

 

 

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Mar 262019
 

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal entitled, “How Sears Lost the American Shopper,” was written not by the retail investors but by ex-employees who were dealing with the decisions made by senior management.  This article was written from the employees’ viewpoint of what went wrong.

In the 1980s, Sears acquired multiple companies in the financial industry including: Discover Card, Allstate, Coldwell Banker, and Dean Whitter.  All of these establishments required capital, which, of course, had to originate from Sears.  The purchases initially resulted in shareholder value but when the time came to divest, time away from the retailer was required.  This was coupled with the fact that Sears was not investing in its own stores during a time when technology was becoming necessary to run a successful business and the retail industry as a whole was changing.

A second area of failure from Sears’ standpoint was seen in the internal arrogance of the company. Initially, competition from companies like Home Depot and Best Buy was not viewed as potentially threatening. It was not until the late 1980s that Sears started to add to their line of retail appliances and began accepting additional credit cards.

By the mid-90s when Walmart was four times the size of Sears and other retail companies were on the uptake, Sears, who was simultaneously declining, decided for the first time to bring in a CEO who had not grown through the internal ranks. The new CEO elected to discontinue the once-famous Sears catalog business. At the same time, the company’s extensive distribution and logistics mechanisms were becoming antiquated.  The elimination of the catalog resulted in the loss of 50,000 jobs.  People from across the county who once had access to everything in the store, now had nothing.

The next failing change came when the CEO decided to place the emphasis on the company’s clothing line instead of on the well-known Sears’ hardware and appliance lines.  Nation-wide Sears retail establishments rearranged their floor displays, placing appliances in the back of the store while clothing was moved to the front.  The ensuing years were witness to more missed opportunities and poor management decisions, including the purchase of the retailer Lands’ End.  Perhaps the final nail in the coffin was the acquisition of Kmart.

One can see that by taking their eye off the core business of retail, and ignoring future opportunities, the inevitable end of one of America’s iconic retails was a foregone conclusion.

What happened to Sears is not much different from what is currently happening, and what has already happened, to a number of breweries.  It all sounds all too familiar.  Part of today’s breweries’ struggles is related to not focusing on their core business.  Many breweries seem to be in desperation mode and are rushing to prop up their businesses with new products, many of which are not malt based liquid.

The exception to this might be The Boston Beer Company who has transitioned from craft beer to teas, seltzers, and a myriad of different products.  One can suggest that Boston Beer was in a better position, or at least a less risky position, in changing their core business.  For other beer companies, the same cannot be said.

Layoffs, cutbacks, reduction in marketing, and resources moved to unproven new and risky products; all the same movements executed by Sears’ management, are now being performed by many beer companies across the industry.  Soon, the beer industry will be experiencing the same unsuccessful results as Sears.

The ultimate goal of the ego is not to see something, but to be something.

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Mar 192019
 

Thirty-five years ago, establishing a new beer was not a frequent occurrence and so doing resulted in a bit of a stir. That beer was Corona. In a few short short years, the brand had made the move to the clear longneck bottle and the results were immediate.  Sales in South Texas took off. The Corona wholesalers, in fact, ran short of supply as they could not acquire adequate inventory from Mexico.

About that time, a young sales manager from Barton Brands, Bill Hackett, decided to fly to South Texas to find out just what the commotion was all about.  Bill saw a tremendous opportunity in Corona and Barton soon picked up import rights for the Modelo’s beers.  A couple of years later, the importing rights were shared with Gambrinus until Constellation (Barton) reacquired all of the U.S.

When Mike Mazzoni left Barton in the late 1980s, Bill took the reigns as president.  After decades of leadership under Bill, it was recently announced that he has retired from Constellation, thus closing the book on one of the most highly thought of supplier executives in the beer industry.

Bill’s legacy is one of respect…. respect within all three industry tiers of the beer industry.  Bill’s contemporary suppliers admired his leadership and success. While he was leading Corona, the brand’s growth was unprecedented.  Retailers loved the marketing support Bill provided behind the Modelo brands and the higher-ring the brands produced.  It was, however, with the middle tier that Bill was most respected.

Bill believed in the wholesaler and the wholesaler believed in Bill.  Bill felt that wholesalers were the key to Corona’s success and he built the Modelo brands on this philosophy.  Bill instilled that culture of the wholesalers’ importance into the employees of Barton/Constellation and the result was a win-win for all.

Earlier this decade a California wholesaler, who had sold their Modelo distribution rights to the AB network, filed a lawsuit against Constellation Brands.  The wholesaler asked for compensation for being denied the opportunity to purchase existing Modelo rights from another wholesaler. The reason the wholesaler had been denied was due to poor performance with their Modelo brands.  Instead of beginning termination proceedings, Constellation sent in a sales team to help the wholesaler turn around their performance.  Within a year, that wholesaler, with Constellation’s help, won the best wholesaler award for the given time period.  This example of Bill’s leadership speaks volumes as to his view of wholesaler relationships.

Baron Beers’ annual wholesaler meeting, traditionally held late winter/early spring in Palm Springs, was the talk of the industry.  Wholesalers never missed that convention.

Bill’s legacy is well documented and he will be considered, by all three industry tiers, to be one of the very best beer executives of all time.  Bill will be missed.

When I see the annual Christmas ad for Corona on the island with the lights on the palm tree, I will always remember Bill.

El Rey – The King…

 

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Mar 122019
 

Last week the Wall Street Journal reported that the chairman of AB InBev, Olivier Goudet, resigned to allow more focus on his role at JAB Holding Co.  This resignation creates a vacancy at the top of the world’s biggest brewer, a brewer with heavy debt load and falling beer volumes, especially in the U.S.

Goudet had served on the ABI Board of Directors for eight years and as the chairman for the last four.  The usual reasons for his resignation were outlined in the press releases including the announcement that Gourdet’s replacement has been identified and will be announced next month.

A great deal has been written about the problems Kraft Heinz has experienced since their merger in 2015, including the 25% decrease in stock values.  Poor cash flow along with a change in accounting rules has resulted in Kraft Heinz altering the first reported operating earnings of $24 billion down to $6 billion.  Kraft Heinz has been following a Zero Based Budget (ZBB) program since the merger, a budgeting process which is similar to ABI’s.

ABI, and now KHC, understand that ZBB can only take a corporation so far.  These companies are acknowledging that brand-building, not cost-cutting, is the key to long-term viability and ROI.  As previously reported on numerous occasions, ABI has lost millions of barrels in sales since InBev bought them in 2008.

Carlos Brito, the CEO of ABI, has followed the InBev cost-cutting model effectively since acquiring SABMiller.  One can only cut so much. Sooner or later something has to be sold to ensure the bottom line is being met.

Brito was not the first to apply these cost-cutting principles to the beer industry.  In fact, one might say that Paul Kalmanovitz was the original cost-cutter in the beer industry.  Long before Brito showed up, Kalmanovitz viewed the acquisition of breweries and brands as a great cash flow vehicle which could be enhanced by massive slashes in marketing, sales, administration, and other cut-backs.

Paul acquired Pabst, Schlitz, Falstaff, Lone Star, Pearl, Jax, Old Style, and other outstanding brands.   He established the companies’ structures with minimal sales and marketing organization and very little field support.  Simply put, he squeezed out all he could.  In Kalmanovitz’s model, the bottom line was the real estate he acquired when he bought the breweries. He seemed to view the brands as disposable, but the real estate, however, would continue to increase in value with little to no downside.

Both Paul and Carlos focused primarily on acquiring breweries that struggled to maintain growth and ROI for their investors.  Both have been very successful.  Although Carlos’s final evaluation is not yet in and based on the last 10 years, something must give.

ABI has attempted to market new and exciting products, and while many of those new products may have legs, the current and past cost-cutting models have devastated AB’s volume.  Next month’s announcement on the new chairman of AB InBev will tell the industry if there are any changes in the future or if ZBB will continue.

Right now I am having amnesia and deja vu at the same time.  I think I have forgotten this before.

 

 Posted by at 6:00 am
Mar 052019
 

Many decades ago when Albert Cramer took the reins for Warsteiner he had two goals in mind.  The first was to become the first German beer to be sold throughout the country of Germany.  A nationwide distribution for any German beer was unheard of at that time, and Albert did soon accomplish that goal which made Warsteiner the largest selling beer in Germany for many years.

Albert’s second goal was to become a global brand.  Part of his strategy was to not only open the U.S. market by starting an importing company, but he also wanted to build three breweries: two in Africa and one in Argentina.

By the early 2000s, however, Warsteiner had lost its dominance in Germany and was struggling worldwide.  Albert possessed an unusual insight into the future in the industry.  He had worked to created alcoholic flavored drinks made of orange, red, and colas flavors.  These products were low ABV but never took off in the U.S.  Albert also created a light beer on the tails of Heineken Light.  The Warsteiner light came in a clear bottle with a decent ABV, but as with the flavors, that beer did not sell well.

The Warsteiner agency in Vancouver, Canada, however, was a successful importer.  The head of the agency had seen the great success of Corona but, he had no product to compete with Corona. In addition to brewing Warsteiner, the plant in Argentina also brewed Patagonia, a beer named after the mountain regions of the country.

Since Patagonia was bottled in a clear bottle, the agency in Canada decided to import Patagonia with the intent that it would compete with Corona.  The first container of Patagonia sent to Canada did very well and sold out quickly.  It looked as though Warsteiner might have a winner.  With the second container, however, there was a QA issue with the bottle caps.  Somehow the bottle caps on the second container rusted causing an off-putting taste.  The beer was quickly returned to the agency and replaced with a new container; however, the bottle caps had again rusted thereby ending any chance Patagonia had of being a viable product.  In the U.S. we were watching Patagonia sales closely. The intent was to bring the beer to the U.S. market had the brand been a success, however, given the poor quality of the crowns, the attempt was thwarted.

In the summer of 2008, Albert with failing health and serious management issues in Africa and Argentina sold all the breweries.  He sold the Argentina brewery in 2010 to SAB Miller who in turn sold out to ABI.  The Patagonia brand remains with ABI.

On a recent trip to Florida, we learned that ABI will soon be importing Patagonia into that state.  The bottle and label have changed, as have the caps!  The quality from ABI will be excellent as will the packaging and, of course, the necessary support will be made available.  More importantly, however, the brand will have the support of the AB distributor network.

Once again, along with national wide distribution, global expansion, alcoholic flavors, and Patagonia, Albert Cramer was decades ahead of the industry.

Whatever happened to…Patagonia.

 Posted by at 7:00 am
Feb 262019
 

In the early 1970s, the senior executives at Lone Star Brewing Co. came from Schlitz.  Harry Jersig, who was the owner of Lone Star, had retained these executives in an attempt to turn the brewery around while simultaneously upgrading the execution of the company.

The required administrative work required of these senior executives was similar to what had been required during their time at Schlitz.  Looking back, the Market Activity Report was simple.   A two-page report; the first page consisting of a review of sales, product inventory, orders, and p-o-s inventory; and the second page consisting of a follow-up from the last visit, the result of any programs the distributor had agreed to, a recap of the program, and the agreed-to-program(s) to be executed during the next time period.

Since most of the distributors were one-brand wholesalers, brewery reps had their undivided attention and program execution was a given.  The entire process was simple to manage for both the wholesaler and the vendor.

During the 1990s, Gambrinus required all field employees to follow-up with their respective wholesaler through a performance letter. The letters, which were predominantly negative in nature and non-productive, were graded internally and posted.

Over the years the Market Activity Reports gradually evolved into annual business planning meetings with both the wholesaler and brewer agreeing upon certain goals.  During the calendar year, both parties conducted monthly review meetings to ensure stated goals were being met, and if needed, adjustments were made.

In today’s market, wholesalers have a plethora of vendors, some with more than 30. In a good size market, the vendors will have market/retail specialists on the street.  Today’s wholesaler might also have a brand manager for the vendors, with many managers having five or more vendors to manage.  If a brand manager has over five vendors, this results in not enough time to devote to even a single day to one brand.  Someone falls through the cracks.  And thus we see the need for market reps.

Wholesalers began asking for weekly recaps from the vendors, the obvious reason being that while the wholesaler works with multiple vendors, the wholesaler needs to know what is being accomplished.  The ideal model would have the wholesaler follow-up with the vendor when necessary and execute as needed.

The wholesaler’s requests could result in vendors asking the wholesaler, “What are you doing each week with my brands?”  This is certainly a fair question. Vendors often have software to programs, like VIP, that enable the vendor to see real-time sales, inventory, and distribution.  Such programs, however, do not give the vendor a complete and updated picture.

The numbers of vendors have exploded in recent years and the number of wholesalers has shrunk. This situation has created challenges in today’s market. The old adage, however, may still be in play: the wholesaler’s job is to put the dog food on the shelf, the brewers’ job is to get the dogs to pick it up.

Written reports stifle creativity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Posted by at 7:00 am
Feb 192019
 

Pierre Celis sold his successful, but under-insured Belgium Brewery, located in Hoegaarden, Belgium, to InterBrew.  Pierre then decided to build a brewery in Austin and bring his Belgium White Ale to Texas.  While visiting Pierre in 1991, just before the brewery was finished, Pierre told me that he initially looked at both Austin and Portland, Oregon as potential locations in which to build his brewery.  At the time, Portland’s craft beer scene was well underway, but the same was certainly not true for Texas.

To Pierre, Austin was a no brainer and he selected the capital city of Texas as the sight of his brewery. A few short years after opening, he sold the brewery to Miller Brewing. One has to wonder what would have happened to Celis had Pierre chosen Portland instead of Austin.

Miller invested in the Celis brands, but had a little success and eventually closed the brewery in 2000 and sold the brand.  The craft beer market was still years from developing in Austin or even in the state of Texas.  Eventfully, the Celis brands were purchased by the Michigan Brewing Co., but it, too, closed in 2012.

Christine Celis, Pierre’s daughter, gained the rights to Celis Brewery in 2017 and opened a new brewery in Austin, rapidly expanding throughout the state with both cans and kegs.  Now, two years later, and after replacing all of the Celis sales staff two weeks ago Celis employees walked without being paid.  If Celis sells again, the next owner(s) will be the fifth since 1991.

In recent weeks, the beer industry has seen multiple long-established craft breweries close.  Just this week alone, after more than 35 years in business, Bridgeport Brewing of Portland, which is owned by Gambrinus, announced it was closing and would be laying off approximately 87 employees.  Just a week earlier, Burnside Brewing of Portland also closed its doors after nine years in business. Other brewers, including Widmer Brothers and Portland Brewing, have closed their taprooms.  Last year 22-year-old Almenda Brewing and Lompac, both in business for 20 years, also closed.

It might be easy to explain why Celis is having trouble or Big Bend closed, but longtime brewers like Bridgeport, present a more challenging explanation.  Compare Bridgeport’s 2011 volume of over 50K bbls. to last year’s volume of just over 10K bbls.  Monetizing all those GABF medals is becoming meaningless!

Pundits have long cited that the taproom and restaurant business model offers a better chance for success versus the go-to classic market model.  The recent closing across the country of long-time successfully established breweries and brewpubs of both models, however, illustrates that these models, too, are also struggling. The strong will survive as the industry finally shrinks and those breweries who can find products which innovate and resonate with consumers will continue to grow.

If Celis does find a new owner, perhaps the fifth owner will make it work. Or maybe it will be the sixth owner?  Pierre Celis never thought it would be this difficult to establish his beer in the U.S. as the closing of Bridgeport Brewery was not even a consideration a mere seven years ago. But then again, neither did Schlitz, Pabst, Old Style, Hamm’s, Jax, Lucky Lager, and on and on and on.

Success and failure are both parts of life.  Neither is permanent.

Editors note;  This post has been notified that Celis is currently still brewing beer.

 Posted by at 7:00 am